The Workthreat Group, LLC
Newport Beach, California
Tel 949.951.1316
Toll Free 866.951.1316
Fax 949.203.2803
Each month, on our Current Events page, The Workthreat Group examines the latest news and trends in a variety of security-related areas. This month's article is by Michael H. Corcoran, Ph.D.
Agricultural
Bioterrorism:
Preparedness
Is Key
We all
witnessed, in shock and disbelief, the terrorist attack on the United
States September 11. We are now experiencing the extra security precautions
and prevention methods that have been enacted and will continue to be
improved.
Add
the prefix bio to terrorism, and now you conjure up concepts of a deadly
gas or chemicals. The United States has seen these agents used in other
countries, albeit rarely, and we know our government has been involved
in working on dealing with these issues as well. But what happens when
you add the word agricultural to all this? And, even more important, are
we prepared to deal with this?
Agricultural
bioterrorism is the deliberate use of disease against plants or animals.
Because agricultural production is more complex than ever before, it is
more difficult to trace than bioterrorism directed against humans, and
it is more difficult to contain. Further, there is the added concern of
economic losses as well as human casualties.
Attacks
Are Rare
Ag bioterrorism
is really not a new concept. Since the 1970s we have been aware of foreign-based
terrorists groups threatening to contaminate food exports to the United
States. There have been a few cases of food contamination in other countries
and, even though it could not be proved that contamination actually occurred,
the products involved were destroyed or taken off the shelves—causing
tremendous economic loss.
In the
United States we have two confirmed cases of deliberate food contamination.
In 1984, the Rajneeshee placed Salmonella in the salad bars of several
restaurants, which resulted in over 750 people becoming sick. In 1996,
a disgruntled employee in Dallas placed Shigella dysenteriae in food he
offered to co-workers, causing 13 people to develop severe diarrhea. Fortunately,
neither case resulted in any deaths.
We have
also had many"threatened" contamination hazards. In 1997, a
disgruntled employee claimed to have tampered with water in a bottling
plant. In 1998, police received an anonymous tip that terrorists were
planning to contaminate meat at a slaughter and processing facility. And,
in 1999, a state agriculture department received word that certain milk
had been contaminated. All of these proved to be hoaxes, but all wasted
countless hours of searching, closing facilities for up to several days,
and producing needless public concern.
Types
of Biological Attacks
How
can these attacks happen? Basically, there are three types of biological
attacks. The first is via injection right into the source or food (like
the disgruntled worker in Dallas). This is by far the best way to ensure
that a particular person or group of people will be affected. But since
this has a rather narrow focus, it is probably an unlikely occurrence.
The
second method is where a large amount of pathogens or toxins would be
used to contaminate a large amount of food, beverages, food supplements,
and even oral medicines...probably at the processing center. If done correctly,
this method could cause hundreds of casualties, to say nothing of the
economic effect of removing the items, closing plants until thoroughly
inspected, or closing restaurants as in the Rajneeshee attack of 1984.
And,
last, there is a potential mass attack on farms or ranches where the pathogens,
suspended in a wet or dry formulation, could be dispersed over a large
target area utilizing aerosol components. Depending upon the environment,
the weather, and the actual formulation, this last scenario could cause
thousands of casualties. However, this is also the most unlikely form
of an attack, due to the difficulty of matching all three of the aforementioned
factors to produce the desired effect.So...what
is the most likely? With all our concerns and safeguards in place designed
to protect human life, livestock and crops are a more likely target. With
the agricultural advances we have made today, generating more on less
land, the introduction of disease would spread very rapidly and controlling
the spread would be extremely difficult.
What
Can We Do?
Short
of turning our farms, plants, processing centers, etc., into armed fortresses,
analyzing the risk would seem to make the most sense. It has always made
more sense to me in my business to determine if a person who has threatened
to harm his supervisor for example, is an actual danger, as opposed to
hiring the National Guard to protect the entire plant against what might
happen.
For
the agricultural bioterrorism threat directed toward harming humans, the
first question to answer is: Who has the capability of putting together
the right formulation of the pathogen or toxin to cause thousands of casualties?
If we take a look at the general population of trained scientists and
technicians trained in microbiology, there probably are not more than
100,000. Of that population, the general consensus is that less than 1%
of any group is inherently evil, and so we might have 100 such scientists
willing to aid a terrorist act. Which leads to the obvious next question:
Which of these scientists would actually deploy such a weapon?
This
is truly the most difficult variant in any assessment. Who knows why Saddam
Hussein, who had mass quantities of chemical weapons, did not arm his
terrorists during Desert Storm? Who knows why the Aum Shinrikyo deployed
their chemical weapon in Tokyo in 1993' And, if you do not know the terrorist
group targeting your product, how can you even begin to answer this difficult
question? Suffice it to say that if it is believed a group has the biological
weapons, it must be believed they will use them.
Thus,
traditional risk assessments for agricultural bioterrorism are useless,
especially if we consider the broader scope of agriculture when the terrorists
only intend to wage an economic war by destroying animals and plants.
Fortunately, we already have in place some excellent tools for fighting
this problem; we just need to increase their depth and abilities.
When
a disease outbreak occurs, no one knows in the beginning if its etiology
is natural or manufactured. Hence, the medical response is to treat the
ill and prevent the spread of the disease while the public health sector
is trying to determine the etiology. Naturally, if it was discovered that
it was some purposeful act, many others would become involved in the scenario,
including law enforcement.
So then,
why not increase the ability of these "first responders?" We
have earthquake preparedness drills, fire drills, even "workplace
violence" drills. Why not agricultural bioterrorism drills? The USDA
and even the Department of Defense have begun generating just such drills,
but how would a city or county respond if suddenly something causes thousands
of deaths within a few days? Whom should they call for assistance and
at what point? How can the food processing plant or farmer mitigate further
problems? Are there systems in place that can quickly identify problem
foods or crops so that not only the right ones are isolated but also to
discover their point of origin quickly?
Let
us also improve the ability of threat assessment by implementing better
reporting systems. Through intelligence gathering and even reporting,
information would be available for ana lyzing and calculating the likelihood
of emerging, reemerging, transported, and deliberately caused infectious
diseases. This may even lead to tracking the pathogen through telltale
molecular structures to determine origin as well as combatant chemicals.
Conclusion
We cannot
stop everything, but preparedness can go a long way in the prevention
game. It sends a message to the would-be terrorists that we are proactive,
which often causes many who would consider such an attack to think twice
and go elsewhere where the preparation is not as great. It also gives
all involved a sense of control. This allows for better handling of even
unexpected scenarios as small successes encourage confidence in approaching
and dealing with the unanticipated. And, finally, it sets a standard:
A standard of cooperation and understanding at all levels of business,
government, and the public. It is this cooperation and united effort that
ultimately defeats all forms of terrorism.
Dr.
Michael Corcoran is an internationally recognized expert in crisis management.
Formerly of the U.S. Secret Service and law enforcement, Dr. Corcoran
specializes in threat assessment, crisis negotiation, and behavioral profiling.
